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The Latin American railways faced serious competition from
another means of land transport for the first time in the 1930s,
and one of the results of this was a significant loss of income
from the transport of products of relatively high unit value. This
income had covered their fixed costs in terms of management
and infrastructure. The financial difficulties of the railway com-
panies drove them to seek aid from the State sector, but in
subsequent decades governments gradually lost interest in them
because of their financial deficits and dwindling importance in
the national economy. The services with the least volumes of
freight and passengers were steadily eliminated, and rail serv-
ices had already become quite sparse when governments de-
cided to return the railways to the private sector as from the late
1970s. The growing tendency of railways to devote themselves
to the transport of bulk cargo between a limited number of
points means that in corridors without navigable waterways al-
most the only competition comes from heavy trucks. The subsi-
dies for the transport of goods by such trucks have been
reduced, but not impeded, by the granting of highway manage-
ment concessions. Within a few years it will be technologically
feasible to charge heavy trucks tolls that really reflect both the
external costs of their operation and those deriving from the
wear and tear on the infrastructure. In the meantime, rail and
road transport could be placed on an equal footing in terms of
competition by compensatory subsidies for the former.  This
would channel each type of traffic towards the means of trans-
port that could move it at lowest cost. In order for the benefits
to be received by the community in general rather than by the
private-sector concessionaires of railways and highways, how-
ever, the policy on compensatory subsidies should be laid down
before the award of the concessions.
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1. Rail tariffs before the emergence of
competition from road transport
As far as land transport was concerned, until the
appearance of the railways road transport had vir-
tually no competition, although in some countries,
including many European nations, canals and rivers
were viable options, and in   the Americas –in pre-
Columbian and colonial times when, especially in the
period of Spanish and Portuguese rule, much of eco-
nomic and social development took place in the strips
of land along the coast or in areas of mineral wealth–
coastal shipping was often preferred to the primitive
roads.
When the railways came on the scene, this repre-
sented a major technological leap forward: before the
invention of the steam locomotive the human race
had never had any form of self-propelled transport.
The appearance of the railways brought with it a very
significant reduction in transport costs, and indeed
–except for very short-distance movements– road
transport virtually disappeared in every corridor
where there was a railway. This monopoly position of
the railways attracted the attention of the incipient
Ministries of the Economy, which began to subject
the railway companies to rules which restricted their
freedom of action regarding the tariffs they charged
(Thomson, 1998). Even in cases where the railway
companies continued to enjoy some degree of flexi-
bility regarding their tariffs, they tended to levy rela-
tively high charges for transporting products of
comparatively high unit value, which was logical
enough in commercial terms as long as the railways
did not face significant competition. In 1886 an ob-
server noted that “All the railways in the world have
accepted differentiated tariffs, because otherwise
low-value  goods could not pay the high transport
charges for long distances” (EFE, 1887). In 1932 the
Chilean State Railways charged 36 cents per ton-
kilometre for the transport of brandies, alcohols and
liquors, 21 cents for wine, and only 15 cents for min-
eral water, although the cost of transporting each of
these categories of beverages must have been very
similar to that of the other categories.
By  transporting products of higher unit value,
the railway companies were able to finance not only
the direct costs of the transport proper but also the
fixed costs in respect of infrastructure, management,
etc. It should be noted that the proportion of the sales
value of the product accounted for by its transport
was still  very small  in  the  case of  goods of high
market value, even though the absolute cost of the
transport was much higher than that paid by lower-
priced goods.
2. The impact of competition on rail transport
charges, and its consequences
Generally speaking, the economic problems of the
railway companies began with the appearance of
competition from road transport, which was particu-
larly interested in transporting precisely those prod-
ucts whose transport enabled the railway companies
to cover their fixed costs as well as modernizing their
operations and paying dividends which kept their
shareholders interested. This phenomenon did not
take place at the same time for all railways: for exam-
ple, in the case of the line between Santiago and Val-
paraíso, where the volume of freight transported by
road trebled between 1934 and 1937, it took place a
long time ago (Huidobro, 1939), while there are other
cases where it has still not occurred, as in the interna-
tional rail links between Salta and Baquedano and
between São Paulo and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, where
there are still no good-quality highways. Table 1 shows
this phenomenon in the case of the Chilean section of
the railway from Arica to La Paz. During the years
covered by the table (1992 to 1996), the paving of the
highway between these two cities was completed, and
this greatly increased the competition from road trans-
port. The railway freight charges for all the products
covered by the table went down in real terms, but
those which went down most were the charges that
were highest   in 1992: i.e., the freight   rates for
products of relatively high unit value, such as motor
vehicles and manufactured goods in containers.
This phenomenon largely explains why in many
countries the railways were taken into the govern-
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ment sector between 1935 and 1965. Over that period
it became evident that private enterprises could not
attract sufficient capital to compete in the long term,
and sometimes they could not even cover their opera-
tions in the short term, at least as long as they contin-
ued to  maintain high-cost services such as branch
lines. In some cases –as for example in Paraguay–
railways had to stop running before the government
realized that they had a socio-economic or strategic
value that exceeded their financial deficit. Without
the railways, great volumes of products of low value
(and hence of low freight rates) would have serious
difficulties in reaching the ports, the factories or the
points of consumption. Likewise, the absence of
railways would seriously complicate the travel of
lower-income sectors of the population.
In government hands, however, the railways
often suffered the adverse consequences of deficient
management and administration, and in some cases,
as in Argentina, they  were subjected to politically
motivated interference that severely compromised
their economic efficiency. Their managers did not re-
ceive clear instructions from governments regarding
the relative importance to be assigned to the provi-
sion of a social service, the promotion of economic
development, or the need to cover their expenses
from their income, thus tending to reduce the effi-
ciency of their management still further. As they were
not obliged to pay their way, however, they almost
always managed to survive and, in a number of im-
portant cases, thanks to the injection of government
funds or government-backed loans, to modernize their
operations in technological but not in institutional
terms. There was a tendency to modernize in the aspects
that most attracted the attention of voters, such as pas-
senger coaches or locomotives, while relegating in-
vestment in the permanent way to the background.
As it was no longer necessary to cover all the
expenses, and also because of the desire of govern-
ments to favour the development of particular geo-
graphical or economic sectors, many of the freight
tariffs charged only tended to reflect the marginal
costs of the transport (indeed, according to the man-
agers of some recently privatized railways, some-
times they did not even cover these costs).
3. Governments decide to return railways to
the private sector
By the mid-1980s, many governments, such as those
of Argentina or Brazil, had begun to sharply reduce
their investments in railways, and towards the end of
that decade they began to ask themselves why they
were channelling large amounts of resources to bal-
ance the accounts of railway enterprises whose role
in the national economy seemed to be shrinking year
by year. In Latin America, the first government to ask
this question was that of Colombia, followed by Ar-
gentina and then most of the others, culminating in
the privatization of the railways, normally by way of
concessions. Sometimes, as had occurred thirty years
before in Paraguay, as a result of their transfer from
private to State management or their return to private
ownership, railways stopped operating for a time, as
happened in Guatemala and Costa Rica.
4. Commercial attitudes of private companies
The new private sector railway managers were not
very interested in carrying freight at rates equal to or
below their marginal costs, and they expected all the
traffic transported to help at least to some extent to
finance their fixed costs. Therefore, although the vol-
umes transported have generally tended to rise with
privatization, some types of freight have ceased to be
transported by rail. A typical case is that of the Chil-
ean railway company Ferronor, which has negotiated
a contract for the bulk transport of five million tons
of iron ore from the Los Colorados mine to the port
of Huasco, while it has ceased to accept traffic of low
volume and even lower profitability, such as cement
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TABLE 1
Arica - La Paz Railway (Chilean section):
Relation between absolute value of freight charges
and relative changes in that value, 1992-1996
Freight charge Change in real
for product, as value of freight




Diesel fuel 122 -45
Wheat flour 85 -20
Vehicles 270 -44
Manufactured
products in containers 120 -58
Zinc 58 -21
Lead 60 -21
Paper and pulp products 95 -27
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data presented in
EFE (several years).
from La Calera to Copiapó or automobiles from
Iquique to Barranqueros (Argentina).
When traffic ceases to be transported by rail it
must either find another means of transport or simply
cease to exist, with unfortunate consequences in both
cases. If it moves to another means of transport, the
economic costs may be higher than those of rail
transport, while if it ceases to exist this will probably
give rise to idle resources, at least in the short term.
It is important to note that the growing concen-
tration of railway companies on the most profitable
types of freight, which are generally those most suit-
able for transport by rail, means that long-distance
buses and low-capacity trucks no longer compete
with the trains. Increasingly, the companies or indi-
viduals which compete with the railway companies
are those that operate heavy trucks.
5. A concrete example of determination of the
economic and social benefits of the railway
Let us take the case of Ferronor once again as an
example. In 1986 the military government of the
time, tired of having to pay for the deficit of this
railway, decreed the elimination of almost the whole
of the southernmost 850 kilometres of its main line
(Thomson, 1997). It was decided to close the line
rather than privatize it because at that time privatiza-
tion was not yet seen as a viable option in Chile or
indeed in the rest of the world. The little traffic trans-
ported at that time over the stretch of  line whose
elimination was approved (between La Calera and
Copiapó) consisted almost entirely of copper ore, be-
cause of an imbalance in the geographical distribu-
tion of the capacity for the concentration of the ore,
on the one hand, and its refining, on the other.
At that moment, ECLAC was developing a meth-
odology that would make it possible to compare the
cost of the wear and tear on the roads caused by
heavy vehicles, the tolls (if any) paid by those vehi-
cles, and the various taxes involved, such as the fuel
tax (ECLAC, 1987a). This methodology was applied to
the hypothetical transport by road of the freight car-
ried at that time by Ferronor over the stretch of line
whose closure had been authorized, and it was deter-
mined that every ton-kilometre transported by road
would represent a net cost to the government equiva-
lent to approximately 0.41 US cents (US$ 222 000
per month) at current prices.1 In other words, if the
subsidy needed to keep the railway going was less
than that amount, then from the point of view of the
community it would be better to pay it in order to
avoid a greater cost in terms of wear and tear on the
roads. A few months later, the government of the
time decided to issue a second decree annulling the
previous one.
II
Highway tolls and the cost of
road infrastructure
1. Wear and tear on the roads caused by
heavy vehicles
It is generally acknowledged that the passage of
heavy vehicles causes structural damage to roads
which vary exponentially in line with the weight of
the vehicles per axle. The value of the exponent var-
ies, according to the circumstances, from 2.4 to 6.6: it
is considered that the value is normally around 4.5
(Rolt, 1981). The default value in the World Bank’s
highway design and maintenance model (HDM
model) is 4.0. This model identifies an “axle equiva-
lent” as the destructive power of an axle bearing a
load of 18 000 pounds (equal to 8.165 tons) and uses
this as the basic unit of analysis. Thus, a truck with
two axles with axle loads of 5.0 and 6.0 tons respec-
tively has an axle equivalent value of 0.36, assuming
that the exponent has a value of 4.5. The same truck
with loads of 7.5 tons on the front axle and 15.0 tons
on the rear axle has an axle equivalent of 16.1, and if
the rear axle load is increased by 2.5 tons the equiva-
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1 In 1992 Ferronor had favourable operating results, while in
1993 it had a deficit of US$ 272 000 per month.
lent rises to 31.6. The axle equivalent fluctuates a
little according to the quality of the pavement, and
generally speaking a truck with a given axle equiva-
lent value will do more damage to a low-quality
highway than to a better-quality one.
2. The toll structure on Latin American
highways
In some Latin American countries,  such  as  Peru
and Chile, the public authorities have for years or
decades past been charging tolls for the use of
some sections of the road system, especially main
highways with relatively high standards of con-
struction. More recently, the charging of tolls has
been becoming more frequent due to the granting
of concessions to private enterprises for the con-
struction or reconstruction, maintenance and ad-
ministration of highways.
As we have seen, a mere change in cargo distri-
bution which results in the transfer of some weight
from the less heavily loaded to the more heavily
loaded axle of a two-axle truck, without altering the
total gross weight of the vehicle, can significantly
increase the axle equivalent value. For theoretically
ideal cargo distributions, table 2 shows the axle
equivalent values for three different types of trucks,
loaded with two different amounts of cargo, and trav-
elling in one case on an asphalt road and in the other
on a concrete highway. Even with such ideal cargo
distribution conditions, it is evident that the wear and
tear caused to a highway is critically dependent on
the axle load of the vehicles using it.
It should be noted, for example, that the axle
equivalent value for a truck with a gross weight of 35
tons and four axles is 2.39 (asphalt) or 3.02 (con-
crete), whereas a truck of the same tonnage but with
five axles has an axle equivalent of only 1.74 or 2.02,
respectively.
The toll structure, by type of vehicle, varies rela-
tively little from one country to another. Generally
speaking, when awarding the concession for a high-
way the government determines the relation between
the toll charged for a vehicle of type i (e.g., a light
truck, three-axle non-articulated truck, three-axle
semi-trailer truck, two-axle bus) and the toll for pri-
vate cars, and then uses the toll per private car as the
critical variable for awarding the concession, which
is granted to the applicant offering to charge the low-
est toll per private car.
3. The relation between tolls and the marginal
costs of using the infrastructure
Clearly, the variation between the tolls charged for
the different types of vehicles does not reflect the
variation between the corresponding axle equivalent
values. Table 3 shows the toll structure for the high-
ways transferred under concessions in Argentina and
table 4 gives the toll structure for Brazil; generally
speaking, the situation is similar for the highways
transferred under concessions in Colombia, Chile and
Mexico.
In the case of highways not subject to tolls, apart
from the purchase of fuel, maintenance services and
the other economic costs involved in the use of any
motor vehicle, virtually the only other payment is the
fuel tax, the level of which often displays in one way
or another an inverse relation with the wear and tear
on the road infrastructure, since the tax is higher on
gasoline than on diesel fuel.
It may be concluded that, even when tolls are
charged, private cars and other light vehicles have to
pay excessive charges compared with the cost of the
damage  they do to  the highways. In  contrast, the
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TABLE 2
Argentina: Relation between axle equivalents
and tolls on highways under concession.
Axle equivalents corresponding to
various classes of trucks a
Asphalt Concrete
Type of truck highway, highway
Structural 20 cm
No. = 10 thick
1. Single front axle, twin rear
axles, non-articulated, with
total gross weight of 18 tons 0.20 0.46
2. Ditto, with total
gross weight of 24 tons 0.97 1.55
3. Tractor unit with two axles
and semitrailer with twin rear
axles, with total gross weight
of 29 tons 1.09 1.37
4. Ditto, with total gross
weight of 35 tons 2.39 3.02
5. Type No. 1 above, with
trailer, with a total gross
weight of 35 tons 1.74 2.02
6. Ditto, with total gross
weight of 44 tons 3.21 3.75
Source: Chile, Comisión Nacional de Energía (1981), through
ECLAC, 1987a.
a Assuming ideal cargo distribution: i.e., with maximum axle load
permitted by law.
charges levied on heavy trucks, in terms of their axle
equivalent value, are very modest compared with the
cost of the damage these vehicles do.
4. Is heavy truck traffic subsidized?
The conclusion reached in the preceding paragraph
does not necessarily mean that there is an implicit
subsidy for heavy truck traffic, since it may be that
all types of vehicles are charged tolls that more than
cover the corresponding costs. In other words, there
is a possibility that there may be a positive levy (that
is to say, a negative subsidy) on the traffic of all
types of vehicles, with this levy being relatively
higher for private cars than for heavier vehicles.
However, this does not appear to be the case.
In table 5, which refers to the highways trans-
ferred under concessions in Chile, comparison of the
figures in the last two columns shows that only in the
case of trucks, and especially those with more than
two axles, is the cost of wear and tear on the roads
higher than the sum of the fuel tax plus tolls.2
It should be noted that in Chile the tax on diesel
fuel  is higher  than  in  some other Latin American
countries. Obviously, in countries where this tax is
lower than in Chile there will be still more likelihood
that the traffic of the various types of vehicles will
cause wear and tear on the roads that exceeds those
vehicles’ contribution through the fuel tax and tolls
that they pay.
In the case of trucks and also of buses with two
axles, from the concessionaire’s point  of view the
wear and tear they cause to the highway costs more
than they contribute in tolls, and it is also obvious
that in the case of highways which are free of tolls
the traffic of trucks and buses with two or even more
axles gives rise to costs in respect of wear and tear on
the road that exceed the amounts collected through
the fuel tax.
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TABLE 3
Argentina: Relation between axle equivalents
and tolls on highways under concession
Indicative Maximum
axle toll at
Type of vehicle equivalent normal
value times of
day, %
Up to two axles and 2.10 metres
high, without twin rear wheels - 100
Up to two axles and over 2.10
metres high, or with twin rear
wheels 1.50 200
Three or four axles, up to 2.10
metres high, without twin rear
wheels 3.00 200
Three or four axles, over 2.10
metres high, or with twin rear
wheels 4.00 300
Five or six axles, with twin rear
wheels 4.00 400
Over six axles and over 2.10
metres high, with twin rear wheels 4.00 500
Source: Prepared by the author. With regard to axle equivalents,
based on Archondo (1989), World Bank (1989, table 6-11), ECLAC
(1987a and b) and Chile, Comisión Nacional de Energía (1981);
values of relative tolls are taken from FLACSO, 1998.
TABLE 4
Brazil: Relation between axle equivalents
and tolls on highways under concession a
Indicative Maximum
axle toll at normal
Type of vehicle equivalent times of
value day (private
car = 100%)
Private car, pickup truck or van - 100
Bus or truck with two axles
and twin rear wheels 1.87 200
Private car or pickup truck with
semitrailer; three axles and single
rear wheels - 300
Articulated bus or truck with
three axles and twin rear wheels 1.66 300
Private car or pickup truck with
trailer; four axles and single rear
wheels - 400
Articulated truck with four axles
and twin rear wheels 5.00 400
Ditto, five axles 4.00 500
Ditto, six axles 2.00 600
Motorcycle or scooter - 50
Source: Prepared by the author. With regard to axle equivalents,
based on Archondo (1989), World Bank (1989, table 6-11), ECLAC
(1987a and b) and Chile, Comisión Nacional de Energía (1981);
values of relative tolls are taken from Pereira, 1997.
a Official vehicles and those belonging to the armed forces and
Military Police are exempt from payment of tolls.
2 Table 5 should be interpreted as a conceptual example rather
than as a faithful reflection of the situation in a specific case. It
is likely, for example,  that  the axle equivalent values of the
vehicles using the highways transferred under concessions are
not exactly equal to those used in the calculations summarized
in the table. It should also be noted that the table does not take
account of the value added tax or the variable costs for policing
and other aspects.
5. Subsidized concessions
Another factor that must be taken into account when
deciding whether or not there are subsidies on truck
transport is whether or not there is a global subsidy
for the concessionaire. It is very difficult to reach
definitive conclusions in this respect. In some cases
–as for example the Santiago-Talca and Talca-Chillán
sections of the “Panamericana Sur” highway in Chile–
the concessionaire is obliged to make a net positive
payment to the State, but in other sections with less
traffic and/or higher investment costs it is the State that
makes payments to the concessionaire (table 6).
Subsidies have been given to companies operat-
ing highway concessions in Colombia, while in Ar-
gentina the government does not charge rent and
several highway concessions are eligible for subsi-
dies, although there are arrears in the payment of the
latter.3 Heavy subsidies have been paid to concession-
aires in Mexico. In the case of the “El Melón” road
tunnel in Chile, however, the concessionaire has to
make payments to the government. Obviously, the
situation varies considerably  from one case to an-
other. Although there are few specific references to
the matter, it seems likely that any subsidy paid is
intended to help finance the initial investment, expan-
sion of traffic capacity or improvement of the design
standards rather  than helping to cover the cost of
maintaining the highway once the initial investment
has been made.
6. Some preliminary conclusions
It may be concluded from the foregoing that:
i) truck traffic on toll-free roads is almost always
subsidized, in the sense that the amounts collected
through the fuel tax and other taxes not directly re-
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TABLE 5
Chile: Relation between axle equivalents
and tolls on highways under concession
Indicative axle Toll Fuel tax Sum of previous Cost of wearType of vehicle equivalent two columns and tear on road
value (US$/km) (US$/km) (US$/km) (US$/km)
Private cars - 0.0231 0.0176 0.0407 -
Pickup trucks 0.10 0.0231 0.0220 0.0451 0.0046
Trucks with two axles 1.87 0.0416 0.0286 0.0702 0.0851
Trucks with more than two axles 4.00 0.0925 0.0400 0.1325 0.1820
Buses with two axles 1.25 0.0416 0.0333 0.0749 0.0569
Buses with more than two axles 1.00 0.0717 0.0400 0.1117 0.0455
Private cars and pickup trucks with
trailer 0.10 0.0347 0.0275 0.0622 0.0046
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the preceding tables and their respective sources; Transporte Moderno, 1996; IMF (several
years), and information provided by Alberto Bull, ECLAC consultant.
3 According to a source in the bus operators’ association, the
arrears of subsidies amounted to some US$ 45 million in 1998.
See Cámara Empresarial de Larga Distancia, 1998.
TABLE 6
“Carretera Longitudinal” (Panamericana) (Chile):
Cross-subsidies among the concessionaires of
different sections of the highway under concession a
Subsidy to concession-
Section aire (-) or payment to
government (+)
(millions of dollars)








Río Bueno-Puerto Montt -129
Source: Friedmann and Hinojosa (undated).
a There have been some differences between the values envisaged
and those finally included in the contracts.
lated to the distance covered are less than the cost of
the wear and tear caused to the roads;
ii) in the case of highways transferred under con-
cessions, there are probably impicit subsidies for
trucks with higher axle loads,4 and
iii) the whole matter is very complex, and there
may be significant differences between one case and
another, so that a case-by-case analysis is called for.
7. The importance of subsidies for heavy
trucks in highway financing
An implicit subsidy of the order of US$ 0.05 per
kilometre for a truck with more than two axles using
a toll highway  operated under a concession corre-
sponds approximately to a net subsidy of some 0.25
cents per ton/kilometre. Is such a subsidy quantita-
tively significant?
Let us take as an example the “Ferrocarril del
Pacífico” (FdP)  in  Chile, which transports  around
800 million net ton/kilometres per year. If it could
receive some US$ 2 million per year extra –i.e., if it
could receive a subsidy at the same rate of 0.25 cents
per ton/kilometre transported– its income would rise
by some 6%. The FdP has currently achieved a deli-
cate balance between its costs and income, and an
increase of 6% or so in the latter would strengthen
the company’s economic situation in the long term.
Another example which could be cited is that of
Ferronor in the year 1995 (when it was still in State
hands).5 If  it had  been  able  to  receive  US$  0.25
more per ton/kilometre transported, its income
would have increased by some US$ 750 000 and
the yield on its net assets would have risen from
0.2% to 1.7%. In the particular case of Ferronor,
the highways in its geographical area are not sub-
ject  to  tolls, so that  the effective subsidy for its
road transport competitors was a good deal more
than US$ 0.25 per ton/kilometre:  probably around
US$  0.71  per  ton/kilometre.  If Ferronor had been
able to raise its freight charges by the latter amount,
its yield would have risen to 4.6%.
In other words, although the impact of the subsi-
dies effectively paid to heavy truck transport on the
railway companies’ finances is relatively small, espe-
cially when tolls are charged and the highways are
transferred under concessions, it can nevertheless sig-
nificantly affect the companies’ economic situation.
Furthermore, if the financial situation of the railways
were improved, this should allow them to compete
better in the market and absorb a higher proportion of
the volume of cargo transported.
8. The feasibility of making heavy
trucks pay fair tolls
In practice, the structure of the tolls charged on Latin
American highways has more to do with facilitating
the collection of the tolls than with seeking to charge
tolls that reflect the wear and tear caused to the roads.
The employees who collect the tolls would be per-
fectly capable of noting the number of axles of the
trucks that pass through their toll stations, but nor-
mally they would not be capable of estimating their
axle equivalent value. Consequently, they could ap-
ply a toll structure using the number of axles of a
truck as an independent variable, but not a structure
in which the toll charged depends on the axle equiva-
lent value of each vehicle.
In some countries such as Iceland and New Zea-
land, the authorities are already selling licences to
travel 1 000 (or multiples of 1 000) kilometres over
the road network, at prices which depend on the axle
equivalent value of the vehicle in question (ECLAC,
1993). For  cultural  reasons, however, this kind of
system might not work effectively in Latin America.
However, it is not technically impossible to pro-
vide each toll station with a weighing machine capa-
ble of determining the load on each axle of a vehicle
passing over it at low speed. Such installations are
already used on the main highways of many countries
in order to verify observance of the rules on maxi-
mum permitted weights. Moreover, modern technol-
ogy  is capable both of determining the weight on
each axle and of automatically charging the corre-
sponding toll and deducting it from an amount depos-
ited in advance by the vehicle owner, using a “smart
card” inserted in a device placed above the vehicle’s
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4 The source of the subsidy varies according to each individual
case. If a highway is transferred under concession without any
subsidy or rental and the cost of the wear and tear attributable
to trucks exceeds the amount they contribute in tolls, there is
obviously a cross-subsidy which is financed by motorists and
the occupants of other vehicles. If the concessionaire does
receive a subsidy, the source of the latter may be the commu-
nity at large.
5 Ferronor has been in private hands since early 1997. The year
1995  is used  for estimating the impact  of the road  transport
subsidy on the company’s finances because more statistical data
are available on its operations when it was a public enterprise.
windshield (ECLAC, 1999). In other words, it is al-
ready possible to envisage that in the relatively near
future it will be possible to apply toll structures
whereby every vehicle is charged an amount reflect-
ing the cost of the damage it has done to the road it is
using.
In reality, the most difficult obstacle to the levy-
ing of efficient tolls on the vehicles which do most
damage to Latin American highways may well be of
a social or political rather than a technological nature,
because of the power wielded by the truckers’ federa-
tions, which would undoubtedly be against higher tolls.
III
How can the inefficiencies in highway
toll structures be taken into account in
railway privatization processes?
1. The system of compensatory payments
made to the “Ferrocarriles del Estado”
railway company in Chile
In the short term, when heavy truck traffic will con-
tinue to be effectively subsidized even on highways
operated under concessions, in order to promote opti-
mal distribution of traffic between road and rail trans-
port compensatory mechanisms should be envisaged
in order to promote the use of the railways, as we
suggested in  a  1992 study dealing with this issue
from the conceptual point of view (ECLAC, 1993).
The year after the study in question, a simple
system of compensatory payments (per net ton/kilo-
metre) was established in Chile to assist the “Ferro-
carriles del Estado” company (but not the other
railway companies in that country).6 It has been an-
nounced that this system will be terminated as soon
as that company’s rail operations have all been trans-
ferred to the private sector, which suggests that the
real aim of its application was not to improve the
modal split of traffic. It has been criticized for vari-
ous reasons: for example, even after the separation
and privatization of freight transport services, these
compensatory payments continued to be made to Fer-
rocarriles del Estado rather than to the company oper-
ating the freight trains (FdP), without there being any
guarantee that the beneficiary would use them to re-
duce the charges made  for  the use of the railway
tracks or to improve the quality of the permanent way
used by freight trains (one of the responsibilities of
Ferrocarriles del Estado is to maintain the infrastruc-
ture of the main lines; the maintenance of branch
lines has been delegated to FdP).
Although it has been criticized, however, the sys-
tem of compensatory payments adopted in Chile
(which will be analysed below from the conceptual
standpoint) was undoubtedly preferable to not having
any system at all. In other countries, not even a
scheme of this nature has been introduced, although
the Swedish experience is also interesting in this area
(Nilsson, 1993).
2. The desirability that compensatory payments
to railway companies for freight transported
should be offered before the concessions
have been awarded
In the study mentioned above (ECLAC, 1993) we ana-
lysed the conceptual dimensions of the problem of
creating the necessary conditions for optimizing the
modal split. In the present article we will limit our-
selves to highlighting the importance of recognizing
this problem when awarding railway concessions.
If the problem is only recognized at a later date,
the government will only be able to solve it by adopt-
ing measures that favour a private-sector enterprise:
namely, the railway company. These measures could
be economic, such as a compensatory payment for
every ton/kilometre transported by rail, or qualitative,
such as the application of greater restrictions on
maximum truck weights. At all events, the proposal
of such measures by the political party in office
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6 Very small compensatory payments  were  also  made on the
basis of passenger/kilometres.
would give rise to criticism from the opposition par-
ties, because the measures favour a private enterprise,
and the trucking sector would assuredly join in the
opposition’s criticism.
If, on the other hand, the tendering conditions
specified the compensation that would be paid to the
concessionaire (or purchaser) of the railway, the eco-
nomic offers submitted by the interested groups
would naturally include an estimate of the present
value of the income they expected to receive under
this heading during the period of the concession. In
this case, the government would not be open to criti-
cisms of favouritism.
It would also be desirable to decide on the pay-
ment of compensation for freight transported by rail
before granting operating concessions for highways
competing in the same market. The benefits gener-
ated by such compensatory payments, which are the
main  subject of the present study, are reflected in
lower road maintenance costs; clearly, it is preferable
that these should be enjoyed by the community in
general, through the government that represents it,
rather than by a private company holding the conces-
sion for sections of the highway system. (There may
also be other benefits –such as those connected with
the reduction of congestion, of road accidents and of
environmental pollution– which will also naturally be
enjoyed by the community).
3. The disparity between what is conceptually
preferable and what can be achieved in
reality
The subsidy effectively received by truckers will
naturally vary considerably from one type of traffic
to another, depending inter alia on the following fac-
tors:
i) the incidence of tolls on the section of road
used by the trucks engaged in the traffic: the greater
the proportion of the journey effected over toll-free
roads, the higher will be the effective subsidy;
ii) the quality of the roads used: the greater the
proportion consisting of dirt roads, riprap surfaces, or
roads which are paved  but  in  poor  condition, the
higher will be the subsidy;
iii) the type of truck, with the subsidy inversely
related to the number of axles; and
iv) the load carried by each truck, since the sub-
sidy is directly related to this weight.
Consequently, conceptually speaking the com-
pensation should be determined for each particular
type of traffic. This could be done, for example, ac-
cording to a methodology described in the study re-
ferred to earlier (ECLAC, 1993). According to this
methodology, before making its offer of freight serv-
ices for each kind of traffic to be awarded by the
market, the railway company would ask the Minister
of the Economy or of Transport how much compen-
sation the government would pay it if it won the
transport contract.
On the other hand, at the time of participating in
the tendering process for the railway concession and
preparing the corresponding economic offers the in-
terested groups will not be in a position to estimate
exactly how much traffic they will transport during
the period of the concession, nor can they know how
much they will receive from the government in each
case. Consequently, from a practical point of view it
is necessary that the tendering conditions should
specify  the amount of money that the government
will  pay the concessionaire for each ton/kilometre
transported. Although this value would not be exactly
equivalent to the compensation corresponding to a
particular type of traffic, it would allow the consortia
taking part in the tendering process to make a realis-
tic estimate of the income they would obtain under
this heading, which they would include in their final
bid.
4. The beneficiaries of the proposed system of
compensatory payments
We shall end the present article with some comments
on the beneficiaries of a system of compensatory
payments to  railway companies like that  proposed
here. Obviously, in all cases the objective should be
to maximize the benefits received by the community
at large.
Three different situations may be identified, as
described below:
i) When the Ministry of Public Works or an
equivalent body administers the road system directly,
the lower volume of traffic by the types of vehicles
which cause most damage to the roads means a corre-
sponding reduction in the cost of maintaining and
reconstructing highways. The reduction in this cost
would be greater than the reduction in fiscal income
from fuel  taxes or  tolls (if  any). The government
could use the increase in its net income for other road
projects or projects in other areas, or it could reduce
taxes in general. In this case, the transfer of the bene-
fits to the community at large is quite direct.
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ii) The transfer mechanism is not so direct when
the highways are in the process of being transferred
to concessionaires. In this case, the groups participat-
ing in the tendering process would recognize, or at
least should recognize, that the compensatory pay-
ments offered to the railway companies would reduce
not only the amount of tolls collected but also the
cost of road maintenance and reconstruction. As the
reduction in the amount of tolls collected would be
lower in absolute terms than the reduction in their
costs, they should take into account in their offers the
consequent increase in net income that the conces-
sionaires could receive. This could be done in one of
two ways, depending on the circumstances. If the val-
ues of the tolls are defined in the tender conditions,
each applicant would raise his offer, thus increasing
the funds available to the government and allowing it
to finance other projects or lower taxes. If the values
of the tolls are not defined in the conditions, each
applicant would reduce the value of the tolls he pro-
posed to charge, in which case the beneficiaries
would be the users of the highway transferred under
concession, rather than the community at large.
iii) The most difficult situation is when the high-
ways have already been  granted in concession, in
which case a renegotiation process between the gov-
ernment and the concessionaire would be needed.
Generally speaking, the transfer of a cargo flow from
road to rail transport means a benefit for the conces-
sionaire of a highway participating in the same mar-
ket as the railway. In this case, however, the benefits
would assuredly have to be divided between the com-
munity (represented by the government) and the con-
cessionaire.
In all three of the above situations the economic
cost of the transport would go down, because each
type of traffic would be directed to the form of trans-
port which could handle it at the lowest marginal
cost.
5. Compensatory payments to the railway
company only in respect of “new” traffic
As already mentioned, in 1993 the Chilean government
decided to pay the Ferrocarriles del Estado (EFE) rail-
way company a subsidy of 2.65 pesos (US$ 0.0066)
per ton/kilometre in order to compensate it for the
effective subsidy received by the heavy trucks with
which it competed.
In 1993, EFE transported  approximately  1 100
million ton/kilometres of freight on its Southern
Network. Figure 1 shows the effects of making
compensatory payments to an enterprise for   each
ton/kilometre transported, based on the case of EFE. It
was assumed in the figure that the marginal cost of
transporting cargo was around 16 pesos per ton/kilo-
metre, and as EFE had a good deal of idle capacity it
was also assumed that the marginal cost was equal to
the average cost.
Assuming that EFE negotiated specific contracts
with its various clients, charging them the maximum
freight rates they  were willing to pay, the volume
transported by its trains would be given by the equa-
tion Q = 2357 - 78.6P, where Q represents that vol-
ume in millions of ton/kilometres per year and P is
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FIGURE 1
Diagram of effects of different criteria
regarding payment of compensation to
a railway company for the subsidies
enjoyed by heavy trucks a
Source: Prepared by the author.
a Based on the case of the Chilean railway company “Ferrocarriles
del Estado”.
the freight rate per ton/kilometre. Before receipt of
the subsidy, the net operating income from freight
transport would be given by the triangle ABC: i.e., it
would be 7 689 million pesos.
Thanks to the compensatory payment received
for each ton/kilometre transported, EFE would begin
to receive not only the freight rates paid by its clients
but also the 2.65 pesos per ton/kilometre contributed
by the government, so that the function relating its
income to the volume transported would be
Q = 2565 - 78.6P. The volume transported by the
company would have risen from 1 100 to 1 307 mil-
lion ton/kilometres and its net operating income
would have risen to 10 881 million pesos, equivalent
to the area FBG.7 The government would have paid it
a sum corresponding to the area EFGC, that is to say,
3 464 million pesos (US$ 8.66 million). If EFE had
been a private company it would have been politi-
cally unacceptable to pay it such a large subsidy, but
it must be recalled that in actual fact EFE was and still
is an enterprise belonging to the public sector.
The compensation based on the traffic of 1 100
million ton/kilometres that EFE already  transported
would not have caused a shift in the modal split from
road to rail transport: it would simply have increased
EFE’s operating income from freight transport. The
company would not have renegotiated existing con-
tracts at lower freight rates but it would have quoted
lower rates for new business from new or existing
clients in order to obtain traffic. It could have made
various kinds of investments to improve the quality
of the product offered, which would have increased
the volume it could transport in the future, but in the
short term the respective sum (some 2 915 million
pesos) was merely a transfer from the government to
the company. In any case, EFE was not under any
obligation to invest its resources in this way, and it
would only have done so if the yield were higher than
that from investing them in other projects.
Obviously, in principle the government could
have offered EFE the unit compensation in question,
i.e., 2.65 pesos per ton/kilometre, only in respect of
new traffic transported by it. In this case, the total
amount transferred to the company would have been
only 549 million pesos (US$ 1.37 million), which
would have been politically more acceptable if EFE
had been a private company.
But, is it feasible to offer compensation only in
respect of new traffic? Above all, this would raise the
problem that, with the passage of time, it would be
increasingly difficult to distinguish new traffic from
existing business. Take, for example, a two-year con-
tract between the railway company and a mining or
industrial concern: in its negotiations with the gov-
ernment the  railway company could maintain that
this traffic should be considered “new” as from the
end of the existing contract, so that from then on the
government should pay the corresponding compensa-
tion, provided that a new contract was signed. The
distinction between new and old traffic will also be-
come increasingly unclear because of the relocation
of plants or installations generating transport needs,
changes in the quality of the road network, and other
factors.
Another item which would create difficulties is
that the railway company would receive the full value
of the subsidy (2.65 pesos in the Chilean case) for the
first unit of the new traffic transported (in figure 1,
the 1,100,000,001st ton/kilometre), while the net in-
come it would derive from the last unit of the existing
traffic (the 1,100,000,000th ton/kilometre) would be
virtually nil, so that it might tend to use its resources
preferentially to transport types of traffic whose
transport by rail might generate fewer benefits for the
country than others.
It may therefore be concluded that, in practice, it
will not be possible, and might not be desirable either,
to pay compensation solely in respect of new traffic.
(Original: Spanish)
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7 In reality, the volume transported went down in 1993 because
the market was shrinking for such reasons as the decline in the
output of the coal mines.
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